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1 Introduction 
The co-evolution of incentives and cognitive mechanisms is actually one of the  
most promising questions for the theory of the firm because “the fact that incentives  
are not taken into account is a drawback shared by all evolutionary of the firm” 
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(Garrouste and Saussier, 2005). For this reason, knowledge should not simply be 
understood as a pure cognitive process but also as a locus in which the political 
dimension becomes critical (for some attempting formalisation see Dosi et al. (2003)). 
Groups, teams or communities of practice play an important part in the creation of 
knowledge and could be an appropriate organisational design for implementing specific 
incentives like rewards or bonus (Cohendet and Llerena, 2003). Knowledge creation by 
such ‘horizontal communities’ may require appropriate intervention for regulating their 
creativity (Miles and Snow, 1992; Miles et al., 1997; Foss, 2003). In an innovative 
context where knowledge has to be combined quickly, it may be difficult for traditional 
hierarchical structures to monitor novelty. Indeed, as noticed by Hodgson, 
“to some degree, the management roles of gendarme and educator may conflict 
with one another. The cultivation of a common corporate culture may require a 
degree of trust between employees and employer and between employees 
themselves. However, habits of trust may be undermined by the excessive use 
of the gendarme role and the presumption by management that employees are 
potentially opportunistic.” (Jacoby, 1990 in Hodgson, 2004, p.411)1 
This is the reason why the nature of organisational rules becomes crucial for the 
development of coercive or enabling hierarchical relations. Among these rules, the  
salary rules are the most delicate and sensitive ones (Livet and Reynaud, 1998; Reynaud, 
1998, 2005). They are also highly controversial and challenging for the implementation 
of a suitable human resource policy inside the firm. It is thus important for a better 
understanding of the coupling of incentives and cognitive mechanisms to study here more 
deeply the role played by such rules in centralised or decentralised organisational set-up. 
From this standpoint, the paper is organised in the following way. We first briefly 
discuss the literature relating the motivational context, particularly the rewards or bonus 
issue, with the importance of rules and trust in the evolutionary theory of the firm. 
Second, we model the dynamics of groups during knowledge creation in the presence of 
different bonus rules. Our main numerical findings on their impact on trust and 
performances of the firm are then presented, leading to some concluding remarks in the 
final section. 
2 The motivational context of the firm: organisational rules and trust 
issues 
As well known, the main goal of the firm is, according to the evolutionary conception, to 
build a set of specific capabilities, either technological or organisational ones.  
The motivational context in the evolutionary theory of the firm is far from being a 
commonplace or a very well-delimited research agenda (about these difficulties for 
introducing the social dimensions see Coriat and Dosi, 1998; Lazaric and Denis, 2005; 
Lazaric and Raybaut, 2005). In fact, this issue was initially present in the seminal book of 
Nelson and Winter (1982) via the truce argument, which introduces the social aspects of 
routines for explaining the stability of the organisation. Indeed, if routines are not 
stabilised or activated with permanent conflicts between organisational members, 
coordination cannot be achieved effectively. In a previous work, we have developed a 
framework depicting the importance of truce and conflicts with the ability of different 
organisational set-ups to cope with the political dimension for sustaining their 
performance (Lazaric and Raybaut, 2005). It is however necessary to go a step further in 
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this perspective, with the analysis of the motivational dimension during knowledge 
creation. For this reason, three main issues, namely, the notion of ‘effort convention’, the 
bonus rules and vertical trust will particularly deserve our attention. 
2.1 The puzzle of the ‘effort convention’ or how to observe the worker’s 
commitment 
As we may recall, the potential analytical interest offered by the combination of the 
industrial relations arguments with the daily functioning of the firm through its firm 
internal labour market à la Doeringer and Piore (1971) was notably suggested by Nelson 
and Winter (1982, p.110). Accordingly, as noticed by Leibenstein, this idea implies that 
“substantial areas of behavioural discretion” exist within organisations. The hierarchical 
structure could not control the daily routines of its members because they are able to 
exercise their discretionary power (Leibenstein, 1987). The relevance of this argument is 
clear: whatever the intention underlying an action taken in a particular circumstance, 
inertia may prevail because the firm’s members may choose to resist the managerial 
dynamics and decide to maintain their organisational practices and their autonomy 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Lazaric and Denis, 2005). In this perspective, Leibenstein’s 
(1979) suggestion is to explore the “micro-micro theory of the firm” to have a better 
understanding of the social context in which the individuals modify their effort. 
According to him, this debate is general since, 
“many organisations allow for conflict resolution through a hierarchical system 
(…). But despite a hierarchical power structure, informal degrees of influence 
may play a significant role.” (Leibenstein, 1979, p.480) 
This remark suggests taking into consideration the importance of organisational  
trust between organisational members who try to find a trade-off between their own 
interest and the organisational one (Simon, 1991).2 This compromise, called the ‘effort 
convention’, is a situation in which the individuals have a discretionary choice of their 
level of performance in quantity and in quality. This ‘effort convention’ between 
organisational members is described as a ‘social habit’ or “a routine that has an 
interpersonal component” (Leibenstein, 1982, p.93). In addition, trust is crucial for the 
coordination and performance in a context of knowledge creation in which employment 
contracts are incomplete. Thus, in Leibenstein’s perspective, trust is a precondition of the 
“effort convention” (Leibenstein, 1975, 1987). Trust has two dimensions in his 
terminology: a vertical and a horizontal one. Without ‘limited trust’, a climate of 
suspicion between workers prevails, leading them to condemn any incentives measures 
implemented by the management. If mistrust is generated by the management, because of 
‘factionalism’, the ‘vertical trust’ is difficult to implement and incentives policy will 
become a problematic issue. Trust issue is obtained with some precarious equilibrium 
between vertical and horizontal trust inside the firm (Leibenstein, 1987, see also Guennif 
and Mangolte (2002)). As we may recall, the puzzling issue of the maintenance of a 
certain level of effort between groups or teams has also been explored by Akerlof (1982). 
In the job called ‘cash posting’, the surplus concerning the productivity‘s workers 
(+15%) could be explained by a social behaviour leading employees to anthropomorphise 
the organisation by considering this institution as a locus where gifts could be exchanged. 
Employees’ gift (in the context a high labour productivity) will be considered in a  
long-term perspective and will push employers to give a certain level of fair wage to their 
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employees. As well known, Akerlof’s arguments explain why the employer may have an 
incentive to pay the employees more than the market clearing wage. This argument, 
however, does not clarify the heart of the motivation of the employees. Trust dimension 
needs to be explored for a better understanding of this issue in the internal labour market 
when employees and employers face strong uncertainties (Williamson, 1993).3 
2.2 A tentative human resource policy: the bonus rules 
Organisational rules as political compromises play a crucial role for maintaining the 
‘effort convention’, even if rules are quite ambiguous by nature and contain many 
possible interpretations (March et al., 2000; Schulz, 2003; Reynaud, 2005). Their revision 
and suspension is a critical process that reinforces or reduces organisational trust and 
consequently the ‘effort convention’ in the organisation. The well-known description of 
the Japanese firm and its comparison with the American one illustrates quite well this 
process (Aoki, 1990; Coriat, 1991). Indeed, the evolution of career opportunities for the 
employees in the Japanese firm shows a diversity of implicit and explicit rules to cope 
with various internal or external shocks and to reallocate the share of productivity among 
the diverse categories of employees (Shimizu, 1999).4 
The recent study of Reynaud (2005) dedicated to the introduction of a productivity 
bonus rule in the Paris Metro shows how this type of rules has partially biased the 
selection of task inside various teams in charge of the equipment maintenance. The teams 
face the following alternative: maximise labour productivity in the short run to receive 
the full bonus or, in a longer-term perspective, continue to do their job as usual with  
and an appropriate trade-off between usual services and corrective procedures.  
The bonus-based productivity of workers enters in contradiction with the traditional 
routines and leaves the opportunity for the workers to choose the easiest procedure. This 
example shows clearly the nature of operators’ choices who tried, on the one hand, to 
benefit from the productivity bonus and on the other hand to preserve a fair way of doing 
their task. The importance of fairness inside industrial relations illustrates why ‘vertical 
trust’ – in the Leibenstein terminology – is important during the revision of the 
organisational rules between the organisational members. 
The recent change of rules in the internal labour market of IBM France is in the same 
spirit (for an overview of IBM HRM policy, see Foulkes, 1980; Wood, 1996, 1999). 
Indeed, in 2002, IBM introduced the following new rule: Teams first agree on prior 
objectives and actually obtain a remuneration increasing with the degree of realisation of 
theses objectives, based on a ranking from 1 to 4. The implementation of such ranking 
has produced the emergence of contentions and conflicts because the rule was  
judged too risky and too subjective with strong inequalities in the distribution of the 
bonus. According to trade unions, this conflicting state resulted in the instauration of 
mistrust between employees and employer accompanied by the end of regular wage 
increases. Thus, the implementation of new rules often shows the disruption of a 
prevailing state of truce with the emergence of permanent conflicts among the 
organisational members, impeding a smooth coordination inside the firm (Arrieux, 2004; 
Eymard-Duverney, 2005).5 
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2.3 Vertical trust or how to reduce uncertainty inside the firm 
Indeed, Reynaud (1998) considers organisational trust as the back draw of the efficiency 
of salary schemes. In this context, trust is not a spontaneous process and may be 
grounded in collective practices, leading to learn implicit commitments inside the firm. 
Diverse rules may be present; for example a ‘step-by-step’ engagement between 
employers and employees could create some positive externalities, a learning that will be 
useful in the presence of strong uncertainties, causal ambiguities, contract incompleteness 
and tacit commitments (Lazaric and Lorenz, 1998). Moreover, the possibility that 
employer and employees may not share the same skills increases the risk of 
misunderstanding and fallacious judgements for each part (Demsetz, 1988; Connor and 
Prahalad, 1996). Indeed, during knowledge creation, when contract between employer 
and employees are incomplete, trust plays a crucial role. First, trust overpasses tasks 
ambiguities and misinterpretation; second, it reduces the potential gap of skills between 
employer and employees (Adler, 2001; Ferrin and Dirks, 2003; Szulzanski et al., 2004; 
Lazaric and Lorenz, 1998; Minkler, 1993). Consequently, trust creates a climate that 
makes easy creativity and innovation. 
An important distinction made in the literature is between the micro and macro 
foundations of trust (Nooteboom, 2002). Micro foundations generally refer to individual 
issues like the perception of self-interest or bonds of friendship or love between the 
agents. Macro sources, we will focus on in this paper, include sanctions from an authority 
(be it the patriarch, the law or the hierarchy) attempting to canalise conflicts inside an 
organisation. They may also include internalised norms of proper conduct, which also 
serve to reduce uncertainty regarding an agent’s likely behaviour (Arena et al., 2005). 
The sources of trust in an organisation may be macro in nature. For example, we may 
trust an organisation because of what we believe to be the case about its internal 
governance structure and how its incentives system sanctions employees’ behaviour  
and encourages them to fulfil the requirements of their various functions and roles. 
In the context of knowledge creation where uncertainty and causal ambiguity remains 
high – notably during transfer of knowledge – the motivation of organisational members 
and their potential ‘absorptive capacity’ turn into key elements (Szulzanski et al., 2004). 
Then, ‘cognitive distance’ is far to be neutral as it could increase or decrease the level of 
uncertainty and the effective absorptive capacity (Nooteboom, 2000). The achievement  
of a sufficient alignment of cognitive maps is also necessary to enable mutual 
understanding. Indeed, in order to achieve a specific task, the categories of thought of 
people that are interacting, must be aligned to a certain extent. The role of the 
organisation is therefore, on the one hand, to reduce cognitive distances between its 
members. On the other hand, the range of cognitive distances refers to the variety of 
knowledge and capacities of the organisation’s members. It therefore plays an important 
positive role in the process of knowledge creation. Consequently, a certain trade-off must 
be reached, which means that the organisation must simultaneously reduce causal 
ambiguity and favour a certain cognitive variety. The network of cognitive interactions 
characterising the organisation is therefore the representation of this trade-off.  
The structure of this network is formally captured by its level of connectivity. This is the 
reason why creativity in each group relies on the achievement of a certain level of 
connectivity among them, in addition to trust, which maintains a high motivation for 
sustaining effort. 
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On the basis of these three key points discussed above, we now propose a model of 
the dynamics of groups during knowledge creation in presence of different bonus rules. 
Indeed, we first assume that the process of vertical trust building in the firm depends on 
the perception of the rule by the groups. Second, we suppose that the level of cognitive 
interactions of each group (connectivity) coupled with vertical trust determines the 
capability of the group to create knowledge. Then, the model tries to illustrate from an 
analytical standpoint the various trade-offs workers encounter and to explain the puzzle 
of co-evolution of incentives and cognitive mechanisms. 
3 Knowledge, bonus rule and trust dynamics: a model  
Let us consider a firm organised around n interacting different groups i. Define by xi(t) 
the level of activation of organisational practice of group i. This variable captures the 
intensity of commitment of the members of the group engaged in an organisational 
practice. We assume that the level of effort of each group, ei(t), depends positively on 
xi(t). Thus we have for i = 1, …, n. 
( ) { ( )}i ie t x t
α=  (1) 
with 0 < α ≤ 1. The hierarchy tries to regulate the efforts exercised by the different 
groups by promoting an average effort norm 
1
( ) 1/ ( )n iie t n e t== ∑ . Organisational rules 
concerning the bonus policy are introduced in order to encourage the energy mobilised in 
each group. We suppose that a bonus is given to a group when its effort is at least equal 
to the average norm. That is when hi(t) ≥ 0, where hi(t) = ei(t) – e (t). In that case, the 
group receives a bonus ( )ih tγ , where γ  is a random variable with strictly positive 
values. Indeed, uncertainty prevails in the amount of available pay supplement.  
In addition, as discussed above, these rules may be modified more or less frequently by 
the hierarchy. 
We suppose that γ follows a Weinbull distribution W[a, b]. This distribution, as is 
shaped below, ranges from a Gaussian distribution when a is large to an exponential law 
when a decreased (see Figure 1): 
Figure 1 Modifications with a of the PDF of W[a, b], (b = 2) 
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In this perspective, we focus on two polar types of rules, a quite risk-less rule and an 
unwarranted risk-bearing one. In the first case (GD), the distribution is Gaussian  
(large a). When they produce a sufficient level of effort, groups have the highest 
probabilities to receive to a certain extent an average bonus rate γ.6 This type of rule  
may favour risk adverse behaviours but is also favourable, as shown below, to the 
improvement of vertical trust. Conversely, in the second case (NGD), the distribution is 
non-Gaussian (small a) and is biased. Efficient groups have here the highest probabilities 
to receive a very small bonus rate γ and a small probability to get a very large one.  
This type of rule encourages risk-oriented behaviours, but it may as well impede the 
development of vertical trust. 
From this standpoint, let us define by τi(t) the level of vertical trust of group i at  
time t. We suppose that 
( ) ( ( ( )) [ ( )]) ( )i i i it E h t S h t z tτ φ µ γ ν γ= + −   (2) 
where, zi(t) is an indicative variable such that 
0 if ( ) ( )
( ) , [ ( )] and [ ( )]
1 if ( ) ( )
i
i i i
i
e t e t
z t E h t S h t
e t e t
γ γ<=  ≥    
are the expected value and the standard deviation of the distribution W[a, b] of the bonus 
rule, and µ > 0 0µ >  and v > 0 are two adjustment parameters. The mean of a Weinbull 
distribution W[a, b] is equal to bΓ[1 + 1/a] and its standard deviation to 
2[1 2 / ] [1 1/ ]b a aΓ + −Γ + . We suppose that φ > 0 captures the collective dimension of 
trust building among groups. Besides, the process of trust building is improved when the 
expected value of the bonus distribution is high, while rules with important standard 
deviation play a depleting role. 
Finally, the process of knowledge creation is localised and modelled in each group by 
a Poisson process with an arrival rate λi(t), where for i = 1, …, n: 
( ) ( )
( ) .i ii
t c tt τλ σ=  (3) 
The first element τi(t) encapsulates the role played by trust in the process of knowledge 
creation. Accordingly, we suppose that a positive relation exists between trust and the 
propensity of group i to create knowledge. High τi(t) favour knowledge creation, while 
small ones inhibit this process. 
The second element, ci(t), refers to the role played by cognitive interactions between 
groups. The structure of interactions is determined endogenously as follows. Define for 
i = 1, …, n, Xi(t) by Xi(t) = xi(t) + xj(t)dij, where, dij is a distance between i and j.  
We suppose that the gain of i produced by the interaction with j is {Xi(t)}η, with 
0 < η ≤ 1. This captures the fact that the idiosyncratic practice of i benefits from 
exchanges of experience with the other groups j connected to i. We consider that dij 
stands for some cognitive distance between the different kinds of knowledge owned by 
the agents. Thus, we assume that distance plays a positive role in the process of 
knowledge creation; but as discussed above this distance is also costly. Assume that this 
cost function is given by {Xi(t)}θ, where, θ > 1, then i creates a link with j if and only if 
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{Xi(t)}η – {Xi(t)}θ > 0. Consequently, a critical distance * ( )ijd t  exists such that the 
structure of connections of i, i = 1, …, n to j = 1, …, n, with i ≠ j satisfies 
* ( )ij ijd d t<  (4) 
where 
1/( )
* ( / ) ( )( )
( )
i
ij
j
x td t
x t
θ ηη θ − −= . 
In the rest of the paper, we simply assume that dij = |i – j|. 
Let, for i ≠ j, lij(t) = 1 if i is connected to j and lij(t) = 0 otherwise. The connectivity of 
group i, ci(t), is defined as the average number of links of i with j ≠ i, j = 1, …, n. Thus, 
we have 
( )
( ) .
1
ijj i
i
l t
c t
n
≠= −
∑
 (5) 
Finally, σ > 0 is a parameter that encapsulates the influence of the organisational set-up 
on knowledge creation. This parameter is an indicator of the hierarchical pressure  
from classical hierarchies (σ > 1) to pure networking firms (σ ≤ 0). Consequently, in 
relation (3), we suppose that the higher σ, the smaller the expected value of knowledge 
creation in group i, λi(t). 
Production in the firm is the outcome of the total level of effort 
1
( ) ( )n iiE t e t==∑  
resulting from the different groups. We have: 
{ }( ) ( ) ( )Q t B t E t β=  (6) 
The term B(t) refers to a global learning mechanism that captures the accumulation of 
knowledge within the firm. We have 
1
( ) 1 ( ) ( )n i iiB t t e tλ== +∑ . Then, total profits are 
given by the profit function: 
( ) ( ){ ( )} ( )t pB t t w tβΕ ΕΠ = −  (7) 
where, 0 < β ≤ 1; p refers to the exogenous market price of the production and w is the 
wage rate, which captures the direct cost of labour.7 
Finally, we suppose that the dynamics of the practices xi(t) is driven by the capacity 
of the group to create knowledge λi(t)ei(t), with i = 1, …, n. Hence, we consider the 
following system of n coupled differential equations: 
d ( )
( )[ ( ) ( ) ( )]
d
i
i i i i
x t x t t e t x t
t
λ δ= −  (8) 
where δ, 0 < δ  < 1, refers to the exogenous obsolescence rate of the practices  
(see Figures 2a and 2b). 
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Figure 2a (a) Type 1 connectivity t = 0 and (b) type 1 connectivity t = tMax 
 
 (a) 
 
 (b) 
Figure 2b (a) Type 2 connectivity t = 0 and (b) type 2 connectivity t = tMax 
 
 (a) 
 
 (b) 
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In the rest of the paper, we conduct numerical simulations of this system to characterise 
the impact of the bonus rate rule on the dynamics of trust and profitability in different 
organisational set-ups. 
Accordingly, we consider two polar cases for the bonus rule, a Gaussian distribution, 
where a = 2.5 and a non-Gaussian one (exponential law), where a = 0.5 (see Figure 1). 
Variety in the organisational designs is a by-product of two factors, the set of the n 
levels of connectivity ci(t) in each group and the hierarchical pressure σ. Concerning 
connectivity, starting with an initial random incomplete structure of links between 
groups, we consider two configurations. In the first one, the dynamics eventually 
produces a structure of complete graph, whereas it remains incomplete in the  
second case. 
Then in the different cases, we compare the properties of the model when the pressure 
of the hierarchy is neutral for knowledge creation (σ = 1) and when it is higher (σ = 2), 
which tends to impede knowledge creation. The different configurations investigated are 
reported in Table 1. 
Table 1 Configurations investigated in the simulations 
Connectivity 
Gaussian bonus rule distribution 
W(2.5, 2) 
Non-Gaussian bonus rule 
distribution W(0.5, 2) 
Initial incomplete and 
Final complete network 
of interactions 
Low 
hierarchical 
pressure σ = 1 
Strong 
hierarchical 
pressure σ = 2 
Low 
hierarchical 
pressure σ = 1 
Strong 
hierarchical 
pressure σ = 2 
Type 1 Connectivity Case 1.1 Case 1.2 Case 1.3 Case 1.4 
Initial and Final 
incomplete network of 
interactions 
Low 
hierarchical 
pressure σ = 1 
Strong 
hierarchical 
pressure σ = 2 
Low 
hierarchical 
pressure σ = 1 
Strong 
hierarchical 
pressure σ = 2 
Type 2 Connectivity Case 2.1 Case 2.2 Case 2.3 Case 2.4 
The additional parameters of the model are specified in Table 2. 
Table 2 Additional parameters 
b n α δ β w p η θ 
2 11 1, 1/3 0.1 0.75 1 10 0.3 2 
We reproduce in below an example of the results obtained in the different configurations 
summarised in Table 1. 
Results obtained with type 1 connectivity  
In this configuration, the network of interactions among groups is the following: We start 
with an incomplete graph in t = 0, leading eventually to a complete graph in t = tMax 
(where tMax = 1 × 106). Thus, we have 
For this structure of interactions, we compute a mean trust indicator 
1
( ) /n ii t nτ=∑  and 
the level of total profits. The following results are obtained: 
Figure 3 displays two regimes of trust, the first one associated with the Gaussian 
bonus rule distribution and the second with the non-Gaussian distribution. In addition, 
mean trust is always higher in the first regime. Thus, the nature of the bonus rule is 
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crucial for vertical trust building. Indeed, groups are motivated by the incentive policy 
and their perception of risk of the bonus distribution. The Gaussian distribution is 
perceived as less risky and is therefore more likely to enable vertical trust building.  
On the contrary with the non-Gaussian rule, groups have to overcome an initial state of 
mistrust, leading eventually to a lower level of mean trust. 
Figure 4 indicates first that the level of total profit is clearly negatively correlated 
with hierarchical pressure captured by the parameter σ. In this case (type 1 connectivity), 
connectivity is finally uniformly equal to unity for all groups, which reveals a  
complete graph structure of interactions. This network configuration is therefore higher 
profitable with a low level of hierarchy. This undoubtedly emphasises the importance of 
decentralised organisational set-up for sustaining knowledge creation and performances. 
Second, in Figure 4, it appears that, for a given level of σ, profits are ordered according 
to the nature of the bonus rule, which is captured by the role played by trust. 
Figure 3 Mean trust with type 1 connectivity: Case 1.1 Mauve: Gaussian distribution with σ = 1; 
Case 1.2 Green: Gaussian distribution with σ = 2; Case 1.3 Blue: non-Gaussian 
distribution with σ = 1 and Case 1.4 Red: non-Gaussian distribution with σ = 2 
 
Figure 4 Total profits with type 1 connectivity: Case 1.1 Mauve: Gaussian distribution with 
σ = 1; Case 1.2 Green: Gaussian distribution with σ = 2; Case 1.3 Blue: non-Gaussian 
distribution with σ = 1 and Case 1.4 Red: non-Gaussian distribution with σ = 2 
 
Results obtained with type 2 connectivity 
In this example, the network of interactions among groups is the following: We start with 
an incomplete graph in t = 0, leading eventually to an incomplete complete graph in 
t = tMax (where tMax = 1 × 106). Thus, we have: 
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For this second structure of interactions, the following results are obtained: 
In this second configuration where interactions are more dispersed (type 2 
connectivity), the results are less contrasted. Indeed, as shown in Figure 5, we obtain the 
same kind of effect of the bonus rule on trust as above. But the two unambiguous regimes 
do not prevail and distinct sustained levels of trust are observed. In particular, the 
situation with important hierarchical pressure and Gaussian distribution (case 2.2) is trust 
dominant, which clearly indicates that a high level of hierarchy and vertical trust building 
are not always conflicting. Figure 6 shows that, on the whole, profitability is still 
negatively correlated with hierarchical pressure. However, this conclusion is more 
ambiguous for the intermediate configurations (cases 2.2 and 2.3). The Gaussian 
distribution with a high hierarchical pressure first dominates the non-Gaussian 
distribution with a lower hierarchical pressure: after a while the situation is lightly 
reversed. Thus in this case, the trade-off between some hierarchical pressure and the 
perception of risk remains quite indeterminate. 
Figure 5 Mean trust with type 2 connectivity: Case 2.1 Mauve: Gaussian distribution with  
σ = 1; Case 2.2 Green: Gaussian distribution with σ = 2; Case 2.3 Blue: non-Gaussian 
distribution with σ = 1; and Case 2.4 Red: non-Gaussian distribution with σ = 2 
 
Figure 6 Total profits with type 2 connectivity: Case 2.1 Mauve: Gaussian distribution with 
σ = 1; Case 2.2 Green: Gaussian distribution with σ = 2; Case 2.3 Blue: non-Gaussian 
distribution with σ = 1; and Case 2.4 Red: non-Gaussian distribution with σ = 2 
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4 Conclusion 
In this paper, we tried to investigate in a same analytical framework the co-evolution of 
cognitive and political mechanisms to discuss the motivational dimension in the firm.  
For this purpose, we refer to Leibenstein’s concept of ‘effort convention’, which explains 
how groups and communities interact inside a hierarchical structure. Then, we discussed 
the importance of trust issues as a precondition for a suitable activation of the ‘effort 
convention’. Salary rules are crucial in this process notably for implementing some 
perception of risk concerning the bonus rule distribution and consequently for sustaining 
a certain state of motivation between organisation’s members. In the numerical 
simulations of the model, we considered two types of bonus rules, a Gaussian and a  
non-Gaussian distribution perceived as more risky than the first one by the employees. 
These rules are compared within different organisational set-ups characterised by their 
levels of hierarchical pressure. Then, the model illustrates the importance of the rules for 
trust building. Indeed, the level of trust increases with the perception of more ‘safety’ 
concerning the distribution of the bonus. However, the degree of risk of the bonus rule 
distribution is not always negatively correlated to the level of profit and, in some peculiar 
cases, the ‘risky rule’ can be more profitable. 
In addition, our results indicate that the structure of interaction between the diverse 
groups matters. Starting with an initial random incomplete structure of links between 
groups, we consider two configurations. In the first one, the dynamics eventually 
produces a structure of complete graph, whereas it remains incomplete in the second 
case. With the first type of connectivity, the network configuration is higher profitable 
with a low level of hierarchy, which emphasises the importance of decentralised 
organisational set-up for sustaining knowledge creation and performances. With the 
second type of connectivity, our results highlight a certain degree of indeterminacy 
between risk and hierarchical pressure. More generally, our model suggests that vertical 
trust may prevail even in a hierarchical structure. This quite unexpected result and the 
role of history in the process of vertical trust building should deserve more attention in a 
future research agenda. 
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Notes 
1As Jacoby reports 
“as industrial studies have repeatedly shown, the presumption of  
innate opportunism is fatal to trust ... It leads to a proliferation of control 
structures – supervision, rules, and deferred rewards – intended to inhibit 
opportunism. These create resentment and mistrust among employees, who 
correctly perceive the controls as expressions of their employer’s distrust.” 
(Hodgson, 2004; Jacoby, 1990, p.334) 
2In the Simonian framework, the individuals in the organisation must accept the targets of the 
organisation and must identify psychologically with these targets (Simon, 1991). 
3As well known, in the case considered by Akerlof the world is predictable by an exchange of gift. 
This situation has been depicted by Williamson with the notion of calculative trust where 
cooperation between farmers follows a predictable and regular way (Williamson, 1993). 
4In Toyota some implicit rules were implemented for sharing the surplus among employees and for 
decreasing the unitary cost of production. The archetypical rule was the following: 
• involvement of employees for constant and permanent improvement of quality and 
reductions of costs aim at reducing the unitary cost 
• increasing of labour productivity 
• increasing of global productivity and wages’ increasing for employees (Shimizu, 1999). 
During the middle of the 1990s, the hiring of temporary workers for facing the lack of manpower 
and financial markets’ crisis led to revise salary rules and to reconsider the so-called ‘horizontal 
coordination’ due to an increasing complexity at intermediate levels (Shimizu, 1999). To sum up, 
Toyota story shows how rules are historical dependent and why new rules could emerge for 
sustaining new hierarchical relations inside the firm. 
5For a longer discussion see Arrieux (2004) and Eymard-Duverney (2005). 
6Assuming that the standard deviation of the distribution is not too large. 
7We thus implicitly suppose that the total productivity bonus is paid on the part of profits  
non-distributed to the shareholders. 
